The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process

DOI10.2307/1913682MaRDI QIDQ4120365zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jerry Green

Publication date 1974

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee23c0ead85f7aeb63ee31489bf663549a7d3105

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

Cited in

(24)

• On the instability of the Edgeworth process
• Satisficing
• An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
• Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: queueing and buyer determinism
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• Agency equilibrium
• Core tâtonnement
• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
• Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
• On contractual approach in competitive economies with constrained coalitional structures
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
• Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Stochastic stability in assignment problems
• Learning competitive equilibrium

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