Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.007zbMath1258.91024OpenAlexW1995226136MaRDI QIDQ665470

Jonathan Newton

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053111001591

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionslearningconvexitycorebargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Recontracting Stability
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining