Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:665470
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.007zbMath1258.91024MaRDI QIDQ665470
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053111001591
91A12: Cooperative games
91B16: Utility theory
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A22: Evolutionary games
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Cites Work
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
- Recontracting Stability
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
