Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations

DOI10.2307/2971721zbMath0889.90169OpenAlexW1992322890MaRDI QIDQ4368688

Murali Agastya

Publication date: 4 December 1997

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/616e66f8acbfa8cff32f6e94703f14f404d4286b

zbMATH Keywords

social learningallocationcore allocationscoalition formationbargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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