Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:516066
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.001zbMath1395.91194OpenAlexW2586882760MaRDI QIDQ516066
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Johannes Buckenmaier
Publication date: 20 March 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.001
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (2)
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Robust stochastic stability
- Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
- Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
This page was built for publication: Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
