Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005zbMath1311.91053OpenAlexW2033435892MaRDI QIDQ2345208

Ryoji Sawa

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsstochastic stabilitybargaininglogit-response dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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