Viable Proposals

DOI10.2307/2527057MaRDI QIDQ4301658zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Abhijit Sengupta, Kunal Sengupta

Publication date 14 August 1994

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527057

zbMATH Keywords

\(\varepsilon\)-stable gamesdomination preorderviable proposals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Farsightedly stable networks
• Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
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• On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
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