Double-interval societies

zbMATH Open1309.91048arXiv1307.5094MaRDI QIDQ2939699FDOQ2939699

Authors: Jacob N. Scott, Francis Edward Su, Maria M. Klawe, Kathryn Nyman 

Publication date: 22 January 2015

Abstract: Consider a society of voters, each of whom specify an approval set over a linear political spectrum. We examine double-interval societies, in which each person's approval set is represented by two disjoint closed intervals, and study this situation where the approval sets are pairwise-intersecting: every pair of voters has a point in the intersection of their approval sets. The approval ratio for a society is, loosely speaking, the popularity of the most popular position on the spectrum. We study the question: what is the minimal guaranteed approval ratio for such a society? We provide a lower bound for the approval ratio, and examine a family of societies that have rather low approval ratios. These societies arise from double-n strings: arrangements of n symbols in which each symbol appears exactly twice.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.5094

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Helly-type theorems and geometric transversal theory (52A35)

Cited In (3)

• Piercing Numbers in Circular Societies
• Piercing numbers in approval voting
• Approval Voting in Product Societies

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