Piercing numbers in approval voting
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Publication:2334834
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.06.007zbMATH Open1426.91101arXiv1710.09493OpenAlexW2963811061WikidataQ110652208 ScholiaQ110652208MaRDI QIDQ2334834FDOQ2334834
Authors: Francis Edward Su, Shira Zerbib 
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We survey a host of results from discrete geometry that have bearing on the analysis of geometric models of approval voting. Such models view the political spectrum as a geometric space, with geometric constraints on voter preferences. Results on piercing numbers then have a natural interpretation in voting theory, and we survey their implications for various classes of geometric constraints on voter approval sets.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.09493
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