Voting in agreeable societies
DOI10.4169/000298910X474961zbMATH Open1200.91085DBLPjournals/tamm/BergNSTW10arXiv0811.3245WikidataQ58182583 ScholiaQ58182583MaRDI QIDQ3060140FDOQ3060140
Authors: Deborah E. Berg, Francis Edward Su, Robin Thomas, Paul Wollan, Serguei Norine
Publication date: 1 December 2010
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3245
Recommendations
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12) Behavioral and social sciences (aspects of mathematics education) (97M70)
Cited In (11)
- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
- Double-interval societies
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Random subcube intersection graphs. I: Cliques and covering
- Approval Voting in Product Societies
- Conformity in voting
- A new lower bound on Hadwiger-Debrunner numbers in the plane
- Helly’s theorem: New variations and applications
- Turán and Ramsey properties of subcube intersection graphs
- Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
- Rationalizable voting
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