Voting in agreeable societies

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Publication:3060140

DOI10.4169/000298910X474961zbMATH Open1200.91085DBLPjournals/tamm/BergNSTW10arXiv0811.3245WikidataQ58182583 ScholiaQ58182583MaRDI QIDQ3060140FDOQ3060140


Authors: Deborah E. Berg, Francis Edward Su, Robin Thomas, Paul Wollan, Serguei Norine Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 1 December 2010

Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: When can a majority of voters find common ground, that is, a position they all agree upon? How does the shape of the political spectrum influence the outcome? When mathematical objects have a social interpretation, the associated theorems have social applications. In this article we give examples of situations where sets model preferences and develop extensions of classical theorems about convex sets, such as Helly's theorem, that can be used in the analysis of voting in "agreeable" societies.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3245




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