Voting in agreeable societies
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Publication:3060140
Abstract: When can a majority of voters find common ground, that is, a position they all agree upon? How does the shape of the political spectrum influence the outcome? When mathematical objects have a social interpretation, the associated theorems have social applications. In this article we give examples of situations where sets model preferences and develop extensions of classical theorems about convex sets, such as Helly's theorem, that can be used in the analysis of voting in "agreeable" societies.
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(12)- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
- Piercing Numbers in Circular Societies
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Double-interval societies
- Random subcube intersection graphs. I: Cliques and covering
- Approval Voting in Product Societies
- Conformity in voting
- A new lower bound on Hadwiger-Debrunner numbers in the plane
- Helly’s theorem: New variations and applications
- Turán and Ramsey properties of subcube intersection graphs
- Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
- Rationalizable voting
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