Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market
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Publication:778095
DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00322-2zbMATH Open1444.91136OpenAlexW3124274916WikidataQ127491379 ScholiaQ127491379MaRDI QIDQ778095FDOQ778095
Authors: Yasuhiro Shirata 
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00322-2
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Contagion and efficiency
- On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
- Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right
- Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
- A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games
- Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory
- Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets
- Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations
- Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand paradox.
- Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets
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