Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand paradox.

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0902MaRDI QIDQ1864809zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Burkhard Hehenkamp

Publication date 23 March 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902

zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand equilibriummonopoly pricingmarginal cost pricinghomogeneous commodityimitation and experimentationsluggish consumers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48312 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54039 (Why is no real title available?)
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade
• Informative Price Advertising in a Sequential Search Model
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(8)

• Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication
• Evolutionary consumers imply monopolies exit
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
• Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market
• Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
• CONSUMER MISTAKES IN BERTRAND GAMES
• The evolution of price competition game on complex networks

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