THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
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Publication:3421641
DOI10.1142/S0219198906001053zbMATH Open1197.91030OpenAlexW2074980754MaRDI QIDQ3421641FDOQ3421641
Authors: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Publication date: 7 February 2007
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001053
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Cited In (7)
- Discretization of information collecting situations and continuity of compensation rules
- Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
- Variational convergence: approximation and existence of equilibria in discontinuous games
- Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
- Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games
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