Local equilibria in economic games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2zbMath0984.91014MaRDI QIDQ5940735

Ana B. Ania, Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot gameslocal evolutionarily stable strategylocal Nash equilibriumscreening models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (9)

Reasoning About Substructures and Games ⋮ Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space ⋮ Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution ⋮ A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic games ⋮ Downsian competition when no policy is unbeatable ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction ⋮ THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES ⋮ On the openness of unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Cites Work

• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
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