Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities
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Publication:4433467
DOI10.1142/S0219198903001069zbMATH Open1051.91007MaRDI QIDQ4433467FDOQ4433467
Authors: Alex Possajennikov 
Publication date: 15 December 2003
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
- The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
- Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability
- The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
Cited In (13)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Unbeatable strategies
- Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
- Learning by imitation
- Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets
- Experimental oligopolies modeling: a dynamic approach based on heterogeneous behaviors
- An adaptive differential evolution algorithm based on relaxation strategy to realize the Nash equilibrium of multi-oligopoly game
- Existence of unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed oligopoly
- Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms
- THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
- Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand firms: exploring imitation and replicator processes
- Imitative and best response behaviors in a nonlinear Cournotian setting
- Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior
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