Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.014zbMath1244.91042MaRDI QIDQ1958946

Jörg Oechssler, Steffen Huck, Jose Apesteguia, Simon Weidenholzer

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2470/1/dp07_69.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

information; stochastic stability; experiments; simulations; evolutionary game theory; imitation; Cournot markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A22: Evolutionary games

Uses Software

• Z-Tree