Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.014zbMath1244.91042OpenAlexW2130407594MaRDI QIDQ1958946

Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Simon Weidenholzer, Jörg Oechssler

Publication date: 30 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2470/1/dp07_69.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

informationstochastic stabilityexperimentssimulationsevolutionary game theoryimitationCournot markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (14)

Imitative and best response behaviors in a nonlinear Cournotian setting ⋮ Unbeatable imitation ⋮ Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets ⋮ Experimental oligopolies modeling: a dynamic approach based on heterogeneous behaviors ⋮ Information and learning in oligopoly: an experiment ⋮ Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks ⋮ Local interactions under switching costs ⋮ When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? ⋮ An oligopoly model with rational and imitation rules ⋮ From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment ⋮ Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments ⋮ The evolution of price competition game on complex networks ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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