Group selection: the quest for social preferences
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Publication:1719740
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.035zbMath1406.91053OpenAlexW2122636431WikidataQ83169607 ScholiaQ83169607MaRDI QIDQ1719740
Publication date: 12 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.035
2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22) Decision theory for games (91A35)
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