Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.04.019zbMath1402.92324OpenAlexW1979521273WikidataQ83761201 ScholiaQ83761201MaRDI QIDQ1624456

Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date: 16 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/group-selection-kin-selection-altruism-and-cooperation-when-inclusive-fitness-is-right-and-when-it-can-be-wrong(b150e8aa-3aed-4340-9d85-56bdaf3be365).html

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationinclusive fitnessaltruismgroup selectionlinear and nonlinear public goods games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

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