The institution as a blunt instrument: cooperation through imperfect observability

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.02.013zbMath1343.91031OpenAlexW2280935968WikidataQ47579910 ScholiaQ47579910MaRDI QIDQ306788

Montasser Ghachem

Publication date: 1 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.013

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityinstitutionsprisoners dilemmaevolution of cooperationimperfect observabilityinstitutional screeningnon-uniform interaction rates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites Work

• Evolving cooperation
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
• Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Credit Scoring and Its Applications
• Quantitative Sociodynamics
• Efficient partner search: Embedded firms seeking co‐operative partners
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
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