Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001033MaRDI QIDQ4433464zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Philippe Grégoire, Arthur Robson

Publication date 2003

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionsecret handshakePrisoner's Dilemmabest-reply dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1361066
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Cites work

• Competition and culture in an evolutionary process of equilibrium selection: A simple example
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Multi-level evolution in population games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction

Cited in

(5)

• Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma
• The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
• Group selection: the quest for social preferences
• IMITATION IN ANIMALS: EVIDENCE, FUNCTION, AND MECHANISMS
• Computer simulations of cellular group selection reveal mechanism for sustaining cooperation

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