A strong anti-folk theorem
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Publication:2491089
DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0010-0zbMath1151.91018OpenAlexW2076878644MaRDI QIDQ2491089
Publication date: 26 May 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/803980/1/sn060224.pdf
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