Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games
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Publication:1196653
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90022-MzbMath0754.90084MaRDI QIDQ1196653
Barton L. Lipman, Sanjay Srivastava
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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