Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents

DOI10.2307/1914005zbMATH Open0419.90102OpenAlexW4246086235MaRDI QIDQ3853476FDOQ3853476

Authors: Robert W. Rosenthal 

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914005

zbMATH Keywords

sequence of gamesgames with varying opponentsstationary Markovian hypotheses

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cited In (22)

• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
• A model of far-sighted electoral competition
• Social learning and the shadow of the past
• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
• Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Bounded memory and incomplete information
• An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
• Matching, search, and bargaining
• Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money
• Equilibrium notions for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences
• Matching models with a conservation law: The existence and global structure of the set of stationary equilibria
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• A dynamic analysis of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games
• Market screening with limited records

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