Divide and compromise

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.04.004MaRDI QIDQ1680104zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Nicolò, Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date 22 November 2017

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/divide-and-compromise(07142dd7-fc6b-4426-93b3-a5b7f773f386).html

zbMATH Keywords

allocation of indivisible gooddivide-and-choose mechanismsubgame perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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• A note on implementation of bargaining solutions
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• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910820 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Strategic divide and choose
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

Cited in

(13)

• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
• Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
• A `divide and choose' approach to compromising
• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
• DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2080437 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910820 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat
• Arbitration, indivisible assets and the possibility of malice
• An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
• Equitable rent division on a soft budget
• Strategic divide and choose

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