A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
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(22)- Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good
- Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
- Implementation via backward induction
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Divide and compromise
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Gabrielle Demange
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Recognition for sale
- Divide-and-permute
- Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
- Dissolving a partnership dynamically
- Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
- Equity in exchange economies
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Fair division with money and prices: bid \& sell versus divide \& choose
- Introduction to the special issue in honor of Michel Grabisch
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
- An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
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