Implementation via backward induction
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Cites work
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Choosing from a tournament
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
Cited in
(14)- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Full implementation in backward induction
- A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
- Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
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