A new perspective on implementation by voting trees

DOI10.1002/RSA.20336MaRDI QIDQ5198671zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Felix Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alex Samorodnitsky

Publication date 9 August 2011

Published in Random Structures \& Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.20336

zbMATH Keywords

approximationMarkov chainssocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Computing with voting trees
• It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
• Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
• Multiple voting location and single voting location on trees
• Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments

Cites work

• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A topological approach to evasiveness
• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
• Approximate counting, uniform generation and rapidly mixing Markov chains
• Choosing from a tournament
• Eigenvalue bounds on convergence to stationarity for nonreversible Markov chains, with an application to the exclusion process
• Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
• Implementation via backward induction
• Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Stronger players win more balanced knockout tournaments
• The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions
• The learnability of voting rules
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(5)

• Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
• Computing with voting trees
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1163867 (Why is no real title available?)
• Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner.
• The learnability of voting rules

This page was built for publication: A new perspective on implementation by voting trees

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5198671)