Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction

DOI10.1007/BF00183343MaRDI QIDQ2365783zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date 29 June 1993

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductioncondorcet social choice functionsgeneralized binary voting procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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(8)

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• Implementation via approval mechanisms
• Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms

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