Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(88)- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
- Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
- Choosing from a tournament
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Social systems analysis
- Dominance solvable games and trees
- Implementation via backward induction
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- To fight or not to fight? That is the question
- A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
- Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination
- Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
- Cooperation in games and epistemic readings of independence-friendly sentences
- Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions
- Polyequilibrium
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
- Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
- A proposal for sharing costs
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- The trembling chairman paradox
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- Competition for procurement shares
- Electing a parliament
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Storable votes
- Implementation of voting operators
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
- Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation
- The basic approval voting game
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- A theory of iterative choice in lists
- Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms
- Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
- A foundation for strategic agenda voting
- Implementation theory
- Social Choice Theory
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
- Unique stable matchings
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- Recognizing distributed approval voting forms and correspondences
- Incentive-based fault-tolerant cooperative payoff design in weakly acyclic games
- Equilibrium and dominance in fuzzy games
- Level-k thinking in the extensive form
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
- Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games
- Two-person pairwise solvable games
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non- cooperative games
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms: characterization and main properties
- Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
This page was built for publication: Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3853384)
