Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
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Publication:1024769
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4zbMath1163.91341OpenAlexW2066386312MaRDI QIDQ1024769
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-134301462
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Cites Work
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- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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