Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment

DOI10.2307/1912643zbMath0475.90010OpenAlexW2085362653MaRDI QIDQ3930967

Rodney Gretlein

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912643

zbMATH Keywords

correctionextensive form gamevoting schemesdominance solvable games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games ⋮ Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting ⋮ Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results ⋮ Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance ⋮ Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games ⋮ Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps ⋮ Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.

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