Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1972.9989812MaRDI QIDQ4768893zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gerald H. Kramer

Publication date 1972

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1972.9989812

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions

Cited in

(26)

• Budget processes: theory and experimental evidence
• Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
• A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
• A group majority voting model of public good provision
• Existence of voting-market equilibria
• The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
• Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
• On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Algorithms for determining equilibrium points in 2V-stage voting games
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
• Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models
• Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
• The legislative calendar
• A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits
• Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights

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