A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1331538
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90142-2zbMath0925.90012MaRDI QIDQ1331538
Publication date: 8 November 1999
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90142-2
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Cites Work
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- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
- A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†