Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
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Publication:2411520
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.005zbMath1415.91118OpenAlexW2737954867MaRDI QIDQ2411520
Publication date: 24 October 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/01-15.pdf
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Cites Work
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