In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
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Publication:2453435
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0676-0zbMATH Open1288.91067OpenAlexW2028561917MaRDI QIDQ2453435FDOQ2453435
Authors: Scott L. Feld, Joseph Godfrey, Bernard Grofman 
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0676-0
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- In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
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