The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
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Publication:5486927
DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_7zbMath1255.91190MaRDI QIDQ5486927
Bhaskar Dutta, Michel Le Breton, Matthew O. Jackson
Publication date: 18 September 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
The Banks set in infinite spaces, A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set, Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
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