The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_7zbMATH Open1255.91190OpenAlexW2125121355MaRDI QIDQ5486927FDOQ5486927

Authors: Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton 

Publication date: 18 September 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-x_7

Recommendations

• The Banks set in infinite spaces
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• The budget-voting paradox
• A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• The Banks set in infinite spaces
• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
• On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• May's theorem with an infinite population
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely has a Hamiltonian Cycle when the Number of Alternatives is Large
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation

Cited In (4)

• A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
• The Banks set in infinite spaces

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