The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_7MaRDI QIDQ5486927zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton

Publication date 18 September 2006

Published in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-x_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• The Banks set in infinite spaces
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• The budget-voting paradox
• A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set

Cites work

• A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely has a Hamiltonian Cycle when the Number of Alternatives is Large
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• May's theorem with an infinite population
• Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
• On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The Banks set in infinite spaces
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules

Cited in

(4)

• Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
• A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• The Banks set in infinite spaces

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