Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00207zbMATH Open1026.91051OpenAlexW2102674878MaRDI QIDQ4789807FDOQ4789807

Authors: Ben Lockwood 

Publication date: 15 January 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00207

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zbMATH Keywords

majority votingdecentralizationfiscal policycentralization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cited In (21)

• Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
• Political Centralization and Government Accountability *
• The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
• Decentralized vs. centralized water pollution cleanup in the ganges in a model with three cities
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the distribution of public funding to political parties
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government
• Experimentation in federal systems
• Environmental policy in majoritarian systems
• The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers
• Uniformity requirement and political accountability
• Local agency costs of political centralization
• Relative consumption and majority voting: supplementing Oates' ``decentralization theorem
• The political economy of (de)centralization with complementary public goods
• Citizen preferences and the architecture of government
• Inefficiencies from metropolitan political and fiscal decentralization: failures of tiebout competition
• Federalism, education-related public good and growth when agents are heterogeneous
• Does tax competition really promote growth?
• Non-Walrasian decentralization of the core
• Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates

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