The trembling chairman paradox

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.11.002MaRDI QIDQ2078032zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

trembling-hand perfectioniterated dominancevoting gamesproper equilibriachairman paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample
• Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(1)

• The chairman's paradox revisited

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