The trembling chairman paradox

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.11.002zbMATH Open1489.91093OpenAlexW3214980293MaRDI QIDQ2078032FDOQ2078032

Authors: Carlos Alós-Ferrer 

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002

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zbMATH Keywords

trembling-hand perfectioniterated dominancevoting gamesproper equilibriachairman paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games

Cited In (1)

• The chairman's paradox revisited

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