The trembling chairman paradox

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.11.002MaRDI QIDQ2078032zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

chairman paradoxiterated dominanceproper equilibriatrembling-hand perfectionvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper studies strategic voting, evaluating general equilibrium selection procedures. Effects of the admission of weakly dominated strategies are discussed. The concepts of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies IEWDS), trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium are explored. It builds a chairman paradox without reference to IEWDS. The paradoxical equilibrium where the chairman receives her worst outcome is the only proper equilibrium. If instead of properness, one relies on trembling-hand perfection, besides the paradoxical equilibrium the equilibrium where the chairman gets her best outcome also survives.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(2)

• The chairman's paradox revisited
• Solid outcomes in finite games

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