The chairman's paradox revisited

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0163-6zbMATH Open1211.91099OpenAlexW2159442761MaRDI QIDQ535264FDOQ535264

Authors: Matthew Braham, Frank Daniel Steffen 

Publication date: 11 May 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0163-6

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Voting power when using preference ballots
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles

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