The chairman's paradox revisited

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0163-6zbMATH Open1211.91099OpenAlexW2159442761MaRDI QIDQ535264FDOQ535264

Authors Matthew Braham, Frank Daniel Steffen

Publication date 11 May 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0163-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
• Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
• The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings
• Voting power when using preference ballots
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(1)

• The trembling chairman paradox

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