Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
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Publication:1149889
DOI10.1007/BF02342605zbMath0454.90094MaRDI QIDQ1149889
Steven J. Brams, Frank C. Zagare
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A10: Noncooperative games
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