The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
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Recommendations
- Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of the auction principle
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
Cited in
(27)- Cost sharing with multiple technologies
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Divide and compromise
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
- Highway toll pricing
- Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
- Sharing a polluted river
- Unfair allocation of gains under the equal price allocation method in purchasing groups
- Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
- A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
- Asymmetric cost sharing mechanisms
- An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
- Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Choosing and sharing
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Parametric rationing methods
- Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation
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