A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games

DOI10.1007/BF00433534zbMath0615.90017MaRDI QIDQ1820997

Güth, Werner, Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auction; pricing rules; envy freeness; fair division game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

Related Items

Dissolving a partnership dynamically, Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale, Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer, Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information, On ring formation in auctions, Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach, Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction, An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure, Partnership dissolution and proprietary information

Cites Work

• Fair division with indivisible commodities
• Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Game of Fair Division
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model