Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction

DOI10.2307/1913717MaRDI QIDQ4207764zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan, Philip J. Reny

Publication date 1989

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913717

zbMATH Keywords

complete rent extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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(17)

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• Optimal forestry contract with interdependent costs
• Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
• Surplus extraction and competition
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
• A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem Without Closure Under Suprema
• Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations
• Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
• Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction
• Principal-agent models
• Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
• Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information

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