Surplus extraction and competition

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00183MaRDI QIDQ2763326zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Michael Peters

Publication date 14 January 2002

Published in The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00183

zbMATH Keywords

correlated valuesdirect mechanismentry feesurplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(13)

• Externalities, market power, and resource extraction
• Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
• Competition among auctioneers in large markets
• Extracting interaction-created surplus
• Full surplus extraction from samples
• Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
• Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
• Verifiability and group formation in markets
• Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Inflating profits and industry competitiveness
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
• From monopoly to competition: when do optimal contests prevail?

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