Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
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Publication:2376075
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0336-8zbMath1269.91040MaRDI QIDQ2376075
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0336-8
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