Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon's dilemma

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0304-XMaRDI QIDQ1006578zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cheng-Zhong Qin, Chun-Lei Yang

Publication date 25 March 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0304-x

zbMATH Keywords

Dekel-Fudenberg procedureinformation robustnessiterative conditional dominanceKing Solomon's dilemmamechanism designVickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
• A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Distributing awards efficiently: more on King Solomon's problem
• Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Robust Mechanism Design

Cited in

(5)

• A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
• Solomon's dilemma: An experimental study on dynamic implementation
• Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
• King Solomon's dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies
• An ordinal solution to King Solomon's dilemma

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