Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
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Publication:850891
DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0027-4zbMath1118.91030OpenAlexW2155563970WikidataQ57920561 ScholiaQ57920561MaRDI QIDQ850891
Miguel A. Fonseca, Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann
Publication date: 7 November 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/774638/77.pdf
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Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game ⋮ Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis ⋮ Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note ⋮ Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players ⋮ Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets ⋮ Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly ⋮ A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game ⋮ Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence ⋮ Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance ⋮ Dynamics and stability of evolutionary optimal strategies in duopoly
Uses Software
Cites Work
- On flexibility in oligopoly
- Market instability in a Stackelberg duopoly
- To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
- Cournot duopoly with two production periods
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
- Endogenous price leadership
- Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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