Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0626-2zbMath1288.91032OpenAlexW2017988013MaRDI QIDQ2452115

Marie Claire Villeval, Emrah Arbak

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0626-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (7)

Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game ⋮ Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game ⋮ Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity ⋮ What happens if you single out? An experiment ⋮ Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations ⋮ Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments ⋮ Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cites Work

• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
• Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments
• Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• The impact of downward social information on contribution decisions
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

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