Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
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Publication:2452115
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0626-2zbMATH Open1288.91032OpenAlexW2017988013MaRDI QIDQ2452115FDOQ2452115
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Cites work
- Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
- Heterogeneous agents in public goods experiments
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- The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
- The impact of downward social information on contribution decisions
- To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
Cited in
(9)- Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games
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- Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
- What happens if you single out? An experiment
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- Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
- Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
- To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games
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