Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9550-3zbMath1378.91057OpenAlexW2109904991MaRDI QIDQ2404225

Raphaële Préget, Marc Willinger, Phu Nguyen-Van

Publication date: 18 September 2017

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9550-3

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsexperimental economicsleadershipvoluntary contribution mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Communication, leadership and coordination failure ⋮ Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity

Uses Software

• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
• To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games
• Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
• Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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