Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game
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Publication:2404225
DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9550-3zbMath1378.91057OpenAlexW2109904991MaRDI QIDQ2404225
Raphaële Préget, Marc Willinger, Phu Nguyen-Van
Publication date: 18 September 2017
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9550-3
Related Items (2)
Communication, leadership and coordination failure ⋮ Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
- To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games
- Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
- Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
- Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
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