To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games
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Publication:991355
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.04.025zbMATH Open1231.91055OpenAlexW1484242533MaRDI QIDQ991355FDOQ991355
Authors: Stefan D. Haigner, Florian Wakolbinger 
Publication date: 7 September 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.025
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Cites Work
Cited In (12)
- Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
- Leadership and the effective choice of information regime
- Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
- Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: an experimental study
- A graph-based model for public goods with leaderships
- Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
- Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game
- Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology
- Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game
- Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games
- Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
- Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
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