Choosing and sharing

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.002MaRDI QIDQ719901zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti, Justin Leroux

Publication date 12 October 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanism designpublic goodsNIMBYdivide and chooselocal externalitiesVCG mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• The selection of joint projects by a consortium: Cost sharing mechanisms
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Effective siting of waste treatment facilities

Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
• Choosing and sharing
• Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
• Effective siting of waste treatment facilities
• Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Multibidding game under uncertainty
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• Voluntary auctions for noxious facilities: Incentives to participate and the efficiency of siting decisions

Cited in

(5)

• Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Choosing and sharing
• Three optimisations for sharing

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